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WALTER HELLERSTEIN
STATE TAXATION AND THE
SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's outpouring of significant state tax decisions in
recent years has elicited little more than a yawn from most constitu-
tional scholars. The nation's preeminent law reviews, which once
were filled with articles examining the Court's state tax opinions, I
pay scant attention to them today. Leading constitutional law
casebooks make only passing reference to state taxation.2 Indeed, the
Court itself has expressed ennui over the prospect of adjudicating a
seemingly endless stream of state tax controversies. 3
The lack of academic interest in the Court's state tax jurisprudence
may be attributable to several factors. Matters of greater cosmic
significance-abortion, affirmative action, and capital punishment,
to name a few-may have crowded state tax questions off scholarly
Walter Hellerstein is Professor of Law at the University of Georgia.
Auroi's NoTE: I wish to thank Milner Ball, Robert Brussack, Paul Kurtz, andJames Smith
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
ISee, e.g., Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible Property, 56 Yale L.J. 640 (1947);
Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 211 (1947);
Lowndes, The Tax Decisions of the Supreme Corut, 1938 Term, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1939);
Traynor, State Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1938 Term, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1939); Devel-
opments in the Law-Federal Limitiations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 Harv.
L. Rev. 953 (1962).
2See Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet, Constitutional Law 210-12, 262, 287-93 336-
37, 521-22 (1986); Gunther, Constitutional Law 331-34 (11th ed. 1985). In earlier editions,
Professor Gunther devoted considerable attention to state taxation. See Gunther, Constitu-
tional Law 684-765, 771-75 (8th ed. 1970).
3See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 268 (1987) ("[a]gain
we are'asked to decide whether state taxes applied to an interstate motor carrier run afoul of the
commerce clause"); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 162
(1983) ("[t]his is another appeal claiming that the application of a state taxing scheme violates
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution").
© 1990 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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agendas. The complex and technical rules that often inform state tax
disputes may have led other scholars to embrace the view of a distin-
guished student of constitutional law: "pursuit of the intricacies of
state taxation ... would require more time and space than the un-
dertaking warrants."'4 And the disrepute into which conventional
doctrinal analysis has fallen in certain quarters may have induced
still other scholars to avoid an area in which doctrinal concerns drive
the judicial process and political and social considerations play a dis-
tinctly secondary role.
Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the Court's output in
this domain has been extraordinary, and its opinions have had an
enormous theoretical and practical impact. 5 The Court's 1988 Terin
was no exception: it considered eleven state tax cases and handed
down full-dress opinions in eight, 6 confronting issues arising under
the Commerce, Due Process, Equal Protection, and Supremacy
Clauses, the First and Eleventh Amendments, and the intergovern-
mental and Indian immunity doctrines. The constitutional land-
scape in the state tax field deserves some re-mapping in light of the
Court's recent decisions.
4Gunther, note 2 supra, at 332-33.
sSee Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Com-
merce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 138 (1988); Hellerstein, Com-
merce Clause Restraints on State Taxation: Purposeful Economic Protectionism and Beyond,
85 Mich. L. Rev. 758 (1987); Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitu-
tional State Tax Discrimination, 39 Tax Law. 405 (1986); Hellerstein, State Income Taxation
of Multijurisdictional Corporations, Part II: Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth, 81
Mich. L. Rev. 157 (1982); Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations on State Tax Exportation,
1982 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. I; Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Cor-
porations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 113 (1980); Hellers-
tein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to
Constitutional Adjudication?, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1426 (1977); Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp.
v. Wages: Enhanced State Power to Tax Exports, 1976 Supreme Court Review 99; Hellerstein,
State Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial
Pipeline, 62 Va. L. Rev. 149 (1976).
6Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 109 S.Ct. 278 (1988); Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S.Ct.
582 (1989); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 109 S.Ct. 633 (1989); Texas
Monthly Co. v. Bullock, 109 S.Ct. 890 (1989); Davis v. Michigan Dep'tofTreasury, 109 S.Ct.
1500 (1989); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 109 S.Ct. 1617 (1989); Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (1989); California State Bd. of Equalization v.
Sierra Summit, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 2228 (1989). The Court heard oral argument in two companion
cases, involving the question whether taxpayers have a federal constitutional right to a refund
of state taxes held to be unconstitutionally discriminatory under the Commerce Clause,
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, cert. granted, 109 S.Ct. 389
(1988) and American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, cert. granted, 109 S.Ct. 389 (1988), but
subsequently set the cases for reargument during its 1989 Term. 109 S.Ct. 3238 (1989). In a
brief per curiam opinion, the Court held that a suit by Oklahoma against an Indian Tribe for
failure to collect state excise taxes on cigarette sales and bingo receipts was improperly removed
from state to federal court. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 109 S.Ct. 1519 (1989).
[1989
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I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause has long been the linchpin of the
Court's state tax jurisprudence. Despite Justice Scalia's skepticism
over the existence "of any clear theoretical underpinning for judicial
'enforcement' of the Commerce Clause,"' 7 the Court's interpretation
of the Commerce Clause remains the most significant constitutional
restraint on state tax power-as it has been for more than a century.8
In its 1977 opinion in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,9 the Court
sought to "clear up the tangled underbrush of past cases"' 0 by artic-
ulating a four-part test to govern the validity of state taxes under the
Commerce Clause. A tax must be applied to an activity that has a
substantial nexus with the state; it must be fairly apportioned to ac-
tivities carried on by the taxpayer in the state; it must not discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce; and it must be fairly related to
services provided by the state. In opinions subsequent to Complete
Auto Transit, the Court has faithfully adhered to this four-part test,
which it has characterized as a "consistent and rational method of in-
quiry" that looks to "the practical effects of a challenged tax" on in-
terstate commerce. "1
The Court reiterated its commitment to the analytical framework
established in Complete Auto Transit in both of the Commerce Clause
opinions it rendered during the 1988 Term. In Goldberg v. Sweet, 12
involving a challenge to Illinois' telecommunications excise tax, the
Court observed:13
This Court has frequently had occasion to consider whether
state taxes violate the Commerce Clause. The wavering doctrinal
lines of our pre-Compkte Auto cases reflect the tension between
two competing concepts: the view that interstate commerce en-
joys a "free trade" immunity from state taxation; and the view
that businesses engaged in interstate commerce may be required
to pay their own way. Complete Auto sought to resolve this tension
7Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1983)
(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
8See generally Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two Cen-
turies of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 Tax Law. 37, 40-45 (1987).
9430 U.S. 274 (1977).
oSpector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 612 (195 1) (Clark, J., dissenting).
"Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980).
12109 S.Ct. 582 (1989).
131d. at 587-88 (citations omitted).
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by specifically rejecting the view that the States cannot tax inter-
state commerce, while at the same time placing limits on state
taxation of interstate commerce. Since the Complete Auto decision
we have applied its four-prong test on numerous occasions. We
now apply it to the Illinois tax.
Similarly, in Amerada Hess Corp. v. Division, Director of Taxation, 14 in-
volving a challenge to New Jersey's denial of a state corporate income
tax deduction for federal windfall profit taxes, the Court declared: 15
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, this Court sustained a
state tax "against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is ap-
plied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to services provided by the taxing
State." We repeatedly have applied this principle in subsequent
cases, most recently this Term in Goldberg v. Sweet. Appellants do
not dispute the soundness of the Complete Auto standard ....
Rather they argue that the ... Tax ... fails each of the four
prongs of the Complete Auto test.
The Court's ritualistic invocation of a verbal formula for adjudicat-
ing Commerce Clause challenges to state taxes cannot provide easy
answers to hard questions. Nevertheless, in an area of the law in
which hundreds of cases had left "much room for controversy and
confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the
exercise of their indispensable power of taxation,"'1 6 the Court's ef-
fort to analyze the issues in a "consistent and rational"'17 manner has
helped to delineate the controlling constitutional principles govern-
ing state taxation of interstate commerce.
A. NEXUS
The nexus requirement reflects the fundamental notion that there
must be "some definite link, some minimum connection between a
state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax." s18 In
recent years, the Court has been quite indulgent in finding the requi-
14 109 S. Ct. 1617 (1989).
15ld. at 1621 (citations omitted).
16Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
17See note I I supra.
'
8Miller Bros v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). While Miller Brothers was decided
under the Due Process Clause, the nexus requirement has been incorporated into the Court's
Commerce Clause doctrine. See text at note 15 supra.
[1989
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site nexus to justify the exercise of state tax power. The Court has
sustained a state's power to impose a use tax on catalogs shipped from
outside the state directly to the taxpayer's in-state customers. 19 It has
also sustained a state's power to tax all the receipts derived by an out-
of-state supplier from sales to an in-state purchaser on the basis of the
presence of the supplier's single resident employee. 20 And, while re-
jecting the notion that the "slightest presence" of an out-of-state
vendor constitutes a sufficient nexus to require the vendor to collect
use taxes,21 the Court has nevertheless sustained use tax collection
liability on the basis of in-state activities that many would regard as
insubstantial. 22
The most hotly debated nexus issue in the state tax field today, on
which more than a billion dollars of tax revenues ride, 23 is whether
the states may require an out-of-state mail-order vendor to collect use
taxes on catalog sales. In 1967 the Court held in National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue24 that a state lacks the constitutional
power 25 to require an out-of-state mail order vendor, whose only
contacts with the state are by mail or common carrier, to collect the
state's use tax on goods sold and shipped to customers in the state.
After chafing under the decision for the past two decades, the states
now assert that subsequent developments have undermined the fac-
tual and legal premises underlying National Bellas Hess.
The states contend that the economic environment in which Na-
tional Bellas Hess was decided has changed dramatically. They point
to the spectacular growth in the mail-order industry, now estimated
19 D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 108 S.Ct. 1619 (1988).
20 Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562 (1975).
2"National Geographic Soc'y v. State Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
2'See ibid. (magazine employed four in-state employees at two offices to solicit advertising
unrelated to mail-ordersales on which tax was imposed); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207
(1960) (company used ten in-state independent contractors to make sales).
23U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State and Local Taxation of
Out-of-State Mail Order Sales 31 (1986).
24386 U.S. 753 (1967).
25The Court referred to both the Commerce and the Due Process Clauses in reaching its
decision, but the decision was rooted in the Commerce Clause. See Interstate Sales Tax Collec-
tion Act of 1987 and the Equity in Interstate Competition Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1242,
H.R. 1891, and H.R. 3521 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 347-48 (1988) (testimony of Walter
Hellerstein). The question whether the Court's decision was based on the Due Process Clause
as well as the Commerce Clause may be significant with respect to the power of Congress to
overrule National Bellas Hess, an option it is presently considering. Ibid. passim.
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to generate sales of more than $50 billion per year, 26 as well as to
striking changes in marketing techniques that permit mail-order
sellers to reach consumers through toll-free (800) telephone numbers
and computer terminals. They also assert that technological ad-
vances in communications, including automated accounting sys-
tems, should dispel the Court's concern voiced in National Bellas Hess
that imposing a use tax collection obligation on a mail-order seller
would create a "welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdic-
tions"27that would frustrate the Commerce Clause purpose of en-
suring "a national economy free from such unjustifiable local
entanglements." 28
The states also point to changes in the legal environment. They
claim that since National Bellas Hess was decided, the Court has dis-
credited the idea underlying the decision that physical presence in
the state is a sine qua non of the state's authority to assert its coercive
power over an out-of-state resident or business. They find support
for their position in cases such as Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 29 sustain-
ing personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants without physi-
cal presence in the state. "[I]t is an inescapable fact of modern
commercial life," the Court there observed, 30
that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail
and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the
need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are "pur-
posefully directed" towards residents of another State, we have
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical con-
tacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.
The Court's opinion in Goldbergv. Sweet is certain to fuel the debate
over the continuing vitality of National Bellas Hess. In Goldberg, the
Court addressed the question whether Illinois' Telecommunications
Excise Tax Act3' violated the Commerce Clause. The tax was im-
26U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, note 23 supra, at 4. The in-
termediate estimate for 1985 was $44.9 billion, with industry estimates well in excess of$100
billion. Id. at 3.
27National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 7 59-60.
28 d. at 760. See Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39
Vand. L. Rev. 993, 1011-12 (1986).
29471 U.S. 462 (1985).
3'0 d. at 476. See also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (sustaining per-
sonal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant based on circulation within the state of the defen-
dant's magazines).
311ll. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, 2001-2021 (1987).
[1989
HeinOnline -- 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 228 1989
STATE TAXING POWER 229
posed on the "act or privilege" of "originating" or "receiving" inter-
state telecommunications in the state at the rate of 5 percent of the
gross charge for the telecommunications. 32 The tax applied only to
calls charged to an Illinois service address,3 3 which the Court under-
stood to mean the address where the telephone equipment was lo-
cated, 34 regardless of where the telephone call charge was billed or
paid. An identical 5 percent tax was also imposed on intrastate tele-
communications by another section of the Act. To avoid multiple
taxation of the call by more than one state, the Act provided a credit
to any taxpayer upon proof that the taxpayer had paid a tax to an-
other state on the same interstate telecommunication taxed by Illi-
nois. 35 The tax was collected by the retailer of the taxable
telecommunication (i.e., the telecommunications provider) from the
consumer whose service address was charged. 36
The parties agreed that Illinois had a substantial nexus with the
interstate telecommunications taxed by the Act, 37 so the Court was
not compelled to address the first prong of its Commerce Clause test.
Nevertheless, in considering the question whether the Illinois levy
threatened to expose the taxpayer to multiple taxation in violation of
the Commerce Clause's fair apportionment requirement, 38 the
Court focused on the possibility that more than one state would have
the requisite nexus, and hence the requisite power, to impose a tax on
the same telephone call that was subject to tax in Illinois.
In finding that the taxpayers had overstated the risk of multiple
taxation, the Court expressed "doubt that States through which the
telephone call's electronic signals merely pass have a sufficient nexus
to tax that call."139 The Court likewise expressed "doubt that termi-
32111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, 2004, § 4 (1987).
33111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, 2002, § 2(a), 2(b) (1987).
34109 S.Ct. at 586 n.6.
35ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, 2004, § 4 (1987).
36111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, 2005, § 5 (1987).
37109 S.Ct. at 588.
3 8This issue is considered more fully below. See text accompanying notes 59-74 infra.
39109 S.Ct. at 589. The Court cited United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 631
(1973) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota 322 U.S. 292, 302-04 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) for the proposition that a state has no nexus to tax an airplane based solely on its
flight over the state. The holding of neither case actually supports the proposition for which it
is cited. In Mabin, the Court sustained a state's power to apply its fuel use tax to aviation fuel
stored temporarily in the state prior to loading aboard aircraft for consumption in interstate
flights. In Nortbwest Airlines, the Court held that the state of an airline's incorporation, princi-
pal place of business, and major repair base could impose a property tax on the entire value of
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nation of an interstate call, by itself, provides a substantial enough
nexus for a State to tax a call." 40 For this proposition, the Court cited
National Bellas Hess with the parenthetical comment that "receipt of
mail provides insufficient nexus." 41 Hence the good news from Gold-
berg for out-of-state vendors is that the Court harbors serious reserva-
tions about the power of states to tax out-of-state firms who exploit a
state's market solely through electronic media42 or the mail and that
National Bellas Hess remains good law.
There is also bad news from Goldberg for out-of-state vendors,
however. For the Court, in assessing the risk of multiple taxation
arising from the Illinois taxing scheme, identified two states that do
have sufficient nexus to tax a consumer's purchase of an interstate
telephone call: a state like Illinois which taxes the origination or ter-
mination of an interstate telephone call charged to a service address
within that state, and a state which taxes the origination or termina-
tion of an interstate telephone call billed or paid for within that
state. 43 While the Court's dicta thus suggest that neither the receipt
of a telephone call-nor the receipt of mail by itself creates a taxable
nexus under the Commerce Clause, the two events in combination
do create such nexus. Otherwise the Court could not have declared
that a state which taxes the termination of an interstate telephone call
billed within the state would have nexus to tax such call. Under the
Court's reasoning, only the out-of-state vendor which carefully
structures its operations so as to communicate with its customers ex-
clusively through electronic media or exclusively through the mails
would retain Commerce Clause immunity from collecting the state's
use tax. 44
its fleet of planes without apportionment. The Court's dictum in Goldberg may cast a shadow
over the holding of state tribunals that sales and use taxes may be imposed on the in-flight sale
of liquor on flights that merely pass over the state, Republic Airlines, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, Wis. Tax Appeals Comm'n, May 4, 1989, reported in [Wis.] State Tax Rptr. (CCH)
203-058, and that overflight time may be taken into account in apportioning an airline's air-
craft to the state. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 307 Ore. 406, 769 P.2d 193
(1989).
40109 S.Ct. at 589-90.
411d. at 590.
42This assumes that one can draw a reasonable analogy between the requisite nexus for
taxing an interstate service (the telecommunication) and the requisite nexus for requiring an
out-of-state vendor to collect a tax on a transaction generated by that service.
431d. at 109.
44This assumes that the requisite nexus for taxing an interstate phone call is substantially the
same as the requisite nexus for requiring an interstate vendor to collect the tax on a sale gener-
ated by the phone call. See note 42 supra. Even on this assumption, however, it might be argued
[1989
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Though less tantalizing than its dicta in Goldberg, the Court's dis-
position of the nexus issue in Amerada Hess was not without signifi-
cance. In Amerada Hess, most of the nation's major integrated oil
companies attacked the constitutionality of New Jersey's denial of a
deduction for federal windfall profit taxes from the state corporate
income tax base. The windfall profit tax is an excise tax imposed on
the "windfall profit" from the production of crude oil. 45 Because the
windfall profit tax is an expense attributable to the production of oil,
and because the oil companies engaged in no oil production in New
Jersey, they claimed that denying a deduction for an expense attribu-
table to out-of-state production, while including income from that
production in their apportionable tax base, 46 was equivalent to im-
posing a tax on such out-of-state production. In so doing, New
Jersey was allegedly imposing a tax on a transaction with which it
lacked nexus.
The Court gave this argument less attention than it deserved. Sei-
zing on the fact that the oil companies were admittedly carrying on
an integrated "unitary business" '47 in New Jersey, the Court ob-
that no nexus would be created under the typical telephone order that is filled by mail. The
customer would ordinarily make a toll-free call that would be billed to the vendor's location.
The Court gave no indication that the mere origination of a telephone call by an in-state cus-
tomer would provide nexus over the out-of-state vendor when the call was billed to the out-of-
state vendor. The fulfillment of the customer's order by mail would likewise fail to provide
sufficent nexus underNationalBelas Hess. The Court's position, however, that a state has nexus
'to tax the origination of an interstate telephone call billed within the state, 109 S.Ct. at 590,
undercuts this argument, unless there is some basis for not considering the contact with the
out-of-state vendor resulting from the origination of the telephone call in conjunction with
the resulting mail-order sale for purposes of establishing nexus over the out-of-state vendor.
The claim that the mail-order sale must be viewed in isolation from other contacts the out-of-
state vendor has with the taxing state for purposes of establishing the out-of-state vendor's obli-
gation to collect use taxes cannot be sustained in light of National Geographic Society v. State
Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977) (nexus over out-of-state vendor created by in-state
activities unrelated to mail-order sales).
4526 U.S.C. §4986-4998 (1982). The levy is imposed on taxable crude oil removed from the
premises after February 29, 1980. Broadly speaking, the "windfall profit" associated with any
particular barrel ofoil is the difference between the market price of the barrel and the adjusted
base price of the barrel, which generally reflects the barrel's price prior to the expiration of
federal price controls. Ibid.
46The taxpayers conceded that the inclusion of their out-of-state production income in their
apportionable tax base was appropriate under the "unitary business" principle. Reply Brief for
Appellants 3, Amerada Hess, 109 S. Ct. 1617; see text at notes 47-48 infra & note 47 infra.
4 7A "unitary business" is an enterprise carried on across state lines in which the enterprises
in-state activities are sufficiently integrated with its out-of-state activities to give the state nexus
with all the activities and to justify a state's tax upon an apportioned share of all the income
generated by those activities. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 163-69 (1983); Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations:
Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 113, 140-53 (1980).
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served that New Jersey had a substantial nexus with the activities
that generated the oil companies' net income, including their out-of-
state oil-producing activities. 48 New Jersey's denial of a deduction
for costs attributable to such out-of-state activity did not "alter the
fact that New Jersey has a substantial connection to the oil-
producing activity by virtue of the determination that this activity is
conducted by a unitary business." 49
By relying on the undisputed fact that the oil companies were con-
ducting a unitary business in New Jersey and focusing on the ques-
tion whether New Jersey had a sufficient nexus with the oil
companies' income, the Court failed to confront squarely the tax-
payers' point. To be sure, from a technical standpoint, the denial of
the windfall profit tax deduction simply increased the oil companies!
unitary income tax base with which New Jersey had a sufficient
nexus. From a practical standpoint, however, the denial of the wind-
fall profit tax deduction was essentially indistinguishable from a tax
imposed by New Jersey on a share of the windfall profit from the oil
companies' out-of-state production. 50
The critical nexus question, then, was whether "the practical
effect" of the challenged tax, which purportedly informs the Court's
Commerce Clause analysis,5 ' was more akin to an effort by New
Jersey to tax out-of-state oil production or to the routine inclusion of
income from a unitary business in the state's tax base. The answer to
that question lies in the appropriate characterization of the windfall
profit tax. If it is truly analogous to a severance tax, as the oil com-
panies claimed, then there is force to their assertion that, by denying
48109 S.Ct. at 1621.
4 9 lbid.
"°For example, assume that a taxpayer's federal windfall profit tax liability is $1 million and
that NewJersey's apportionable share of the taxpayer's income is 20 per cent. Under the New
Jersey corporate income tax, the taxpayer was required to add $1 million to its apportionable
tax base, which is generally patterned after its federal income tax base, because the $1 million
had been subtracted from its federal tax base pursuant to I.R.C. § 164(a)(5). Twenty percent of
the $1 million, or $200,000 would be apportioned to New Jersey and New Jersey's 9 percent
corporate income tax rate would be applied to produce an increased tax liability of $18,000. If
New Jersey had simply adopted its own "apportioned" windfall profit tax at 9 percent of the
federal rate, the taxpayer's tax liability would be increased by 9 percent of the $1 million
federal tax liability or $90,000. New Jersey's apportioned share of this figure would be 20 per-
cent of $90,000 or $18,000, precisely the same increase in tax liability resulting from the add-
back of federal windfall profit taxes under the statutory procedure. See Brief for Appellants at
37 n. 16, Amerada Hess, 109 S.Ct. 1637.
51See Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279; text at note 10 supra.
[1989
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a deduction for the windfall profit tax, New Jersey was in substance
taxing out-of-state transactions under the guise of taxing unitary
business income. Indeed, the Court has indicated that only the state
in which mineral production occurs has sufficient nexus to impose a
severance tax on such production: "'the severance can occur in no
other state' and 'no other state can tax the severance."' 52 On the
other hand, if the windfall profit tax may fairly be characterized as a
levy on the oil companies' unitary income rather than as a site-
specific expense, as New Jersey contended,5 3 then the Court was
fully warranted in concluding that New Jersey's denial of a deduc-
tion for a cost associated with the earning of that income did not
amount in substance to a tax on an activity with which New Jersey
lacked nexus.
Whatever the "true" nature of the federal windfall profit tax, an
issue over which much ink has been spilled,54 the Court's holding
without further explanation in Amerada Hess is troublesome. If a state
as a matter of law has a substantial nexus with any expense associated
with income derived from a unitary business carried on in the state,
then states may be free to deny deductions which relate to ex-
clusively out-of-state activity while at the same time taxing (under
the unitary business principle55) income derived from those very
same activities. This raises the specter of states skewing their denial
of deductions so as to permit deductions for in-state activities while
denying deductions for out-of-state activities. The objectionable as-
pects of such a practice may more appropriately be analyzed under
the Commerce Clause's fair apportionment or nondiscrimination cri-
teria.5 6 Nevertheless, the Court could have limited the possibility of
geographic skewing of deductions had it been willing to say that the
Commerce Clause requires that states must have nexus with ac-
52Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981).
S3Brief for Appellee at 26-33, Amerada Hess, 109 S.Ct. 1617; id. at 1622 n.7.
54See, e.g., Attermeier & Reveley, Characterizing the Windfall Profit Tax for State Income
Tax Purposes, 32 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 465 (1984); Robison, The Misnamed Tax: The Crude Oil
Windfall Profits Tax of 1980, 84 Dick. L. Rev. 589 (1980). As noted below, see textaccompany-
ing notes 80-81 infra, the oil companies had the better of the argument over the question
whether the windfall profit tax should be characterized as a site-specific cost, even though the
Court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue. Amerada Hess, 109 S.Ct. at 1622 n.7.
55See note 46 supra.
S6These issues are addressed below. See text accompanying notes 75-82 and notes 96-100
infra.
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tivities whose costs are deducted from unitary income as well as with
the unitary income itself.
B. APPORTIONMENT
The requirement that a tax affecting interstate commerce be fairly
apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state is vener-
able. 5 It has acquired greater significance, however, as the Court's
decisions have broadened the states' taxing powers. With the aban-
donment of the formal criteria that once created an irreducible zone
of tax immunity for interstate commerce,5 8 the Court's emphasis has
shifted from the question whether interstate commerce may be taxed
at all to the question whether interstate commerce is being made to
bear its fair share-or more than its fair share-of the state tax bur-
den. If a tax is fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in the
taxing state, there is no risk, at least in principle, that a tax will sub-
ject a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce to more than its fair
share of the tax burden and expose it to a risk of multiple taxation not
borne by local commerce.
Both of the Commerce Clause decisions rendered by the Court
during its 1988 Term raised significant apportionment issues. In
Goldberg,59 the taxpayers60 contended that Illinois' telecommunica-
tions tax violated the Commerce Clause's fair apportionment re-
quirement because it was levied on the gross charge of each telephone
call. They argued that the fair apportionment requirement com-
pelled Illinois to include within its tax base only the portion of the
gross charge of each interstate telecommunication that reflected the
ratio of in-state activity to total activity associated with the telecom-
munication. They pointed to the apportionment formulas that the
states have developed and the Court has approved for apportioning
the tax bases of other instrumentalities of interstate commerce en-
57 See, e.g., Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891); Maine v.
Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217, 278 (1891).
5 8See Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274; Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme
Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?, 75 Mich. L. Rev.
1426, 1441-46(1977).
5 9The facts of Goldberg are set out at text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
6OThe named plaintiff, Goldberg, was a taxpayer whose liability arose out of the telephone
calls charged to his service address. However, GTE Sprint Communications Corporation,
whose challenge to the Illinois tax was also before the Court in a companion case (GTE Com-
munications Corp. v. Sweet), was technically a tax collector rather than a taxpayer. For sake of
simplicity, all challengers to the tax will be referred to as taxpayers.
[1989
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gaged in land, water, and air transportation, based on such factors as
track mileage, 61 barge line mileage,62 and revenue tons. 63 By anal-
ogy, they claimed, Illinois was required to apportion taxable gross
receipts from the interstate telecommunications by some equivalent
ratio, such as the miles the electronic signals traveled within Illinois
to the total miles traveled. 64
The short answer to the taxpayers' claim was that Illinois did ap-
portion its tax. By taxing only the receipts from calls originating or
terminating in Illinois that were charged to an Illinois service ad-
dress, 65 Illinois effectively taxed only half the universe of interstate
telecommunications originating or terminating in Illinois. This as-
sumes, quite reasonably I believe, that roughly half of the calls ori-
ginating or terminating in Illinois are charged to an Illinois service
address with the other half charged to the service address of the caller
in the other state in which the call originated or terminated. Since no
states other than the state of origination or termination have the
power to impose a tax on an interstate telecommunication-a fact
made clear in the Court's nexus discussion 66-Illinois' "charged-to-
an-Illinois-service-address" limitation on its tax effected a 50 percent
apportionment of the tax base to Illinois. Such an apportionment
should satisfy constitutional strictures in a domain in which "rough
approximation" rather than "precision" is the controlling standard. 67
The Court, however, took a more circuitous route to the same
conclusion. Invoking the language of Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Board,68 the Court viewed the fair apportionment re-
quirement as triggering an inquiry into the question whether a tax is
"internally and externally consistent."'69 The Court's "internal con-
sistency" test, which the Court has recently grafted onto the body of
its Commerce Clause doctrine, 70 requires that a tax "be structured so
6 1See, e.g., Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421(1894).
62See, e.g., Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169(1949).
63BraniffAirways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 (1947).
64109 S. Ct. at 588.
6"See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
66See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
67 Illinois Central R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157, 161 (1940).
68463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983).
69109 S.Ct. at 588.
70 See generally Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging
Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 138 (1988).
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that if every State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxa-
tion would result." 71 The Illinois levy plainly satisfied this standard.
If every state confined its telecommunications tax levy to receipts
from interstate telephone calls that were charged to an in-state ser-
vice address, only one state would tax the receipts from each inter-
state call.
The Court then turned to the "external consistency" standard,
which reflects familiar Commerce Clause doctrine requiring fair ap-
portionment. Here the Court confronted a thornier problem. The
Illinois tax was clearly unapportioned, in the sense that the tax ap-
plied to the gross charge of an interstate activity, and there was no
formulary apportionment of the tax base to reflect in-state activity.
The Court responded to this objection on several-and not wholly
consistent-grounds. The tax was like a sales tax and did not need to
be apportioned; the tax was fairly apportioned because it created lit-
tle risk of multiple taxation; the tax created some risk of multiple tax-
ation, but provision of a tax credit eliminated the possibility of actual
multiple taxation; and true apportionment of the tax base, on a
mileage or other geographic basis, was administratively and tech-
nologically impossible in light of the complexity of contemporary
telecommunications networks. 72
As indicated above, I have no quarrel with the Court's conclusion
that the Illinois tax was fairly apportioned. 73 It is unfortunate, how-
ever, that the Court failed to embrace the most straightforward re-
sponse to the fair apportionment claim. Each of the justifications the
Court advanced for its conclusion that the Illinois tax was fairly ap-
portioned has weaknesses, 74 and they may come back to haunt the
7
'Goldberg, 109 S.Ct. at 589.
721d. at 589-91.
73See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
74(1) The tax was like a sales tax and did not need to be apportioned. It is true that the tax had many
of the characteristics of a retail sales tax in that it was assessed on the individual consumer, it
was measured by the price of the service sold, and it was collected by the retailer. It is also true
that retail sales taxes generally are not apportioned. As I have explained in detail elsewhere,
however, our tolerance of unapportioned sales taxes is largely a creature of administrative ne-
cessity and represents no more than a second-best solution to the fair apportionment of receipts
from an interstate transaction over which more than one state may legitimately exercise taxing
power. See Hellerstein, note 70 supra, at 170-88. Moreover, the Court has unjustifiably ex-
tended its tolerance of unapportioned retail sales taxes to unapportioned business gross receipts
taxes. Ibid. Because the line between retail sales taxes and general business gross receipts taxes
is not always clear (at least to the Court), and because there is a risk that the Court may extend
its analysis of the retail gross receipts tax in Goldberg to the business gross receipts taxes that
many states impose on telecommunications and other public service companies, it would have
been better if the Court had not put its imprimatur upon an unapportioned levy in this context.
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Court in other contexts. As some of us instruct our law students on
exams, a good short answer will receive a higher grade than an
equally good longer answer.
The Court did give a short answer to the apportionment question
raised by Amerada Hess.75 Unfortunately, this question required a
longer answer. The gravamen of the oil companies' claim was that
New Jersey, by denying a deduction for an out-of-state expense (the
windfall profit tax), geographically skewed their apportionable in-
come to assign more income to New Jersey than was fairly attri-
butable to their activities in the state. The Court's response was
essentially a reiteration of its rationale for rejecting the taxpayer's
nexus claim:76 "[F]or apportionment purposes, it is inappropriate to
consider the windfall profit tax as an out-of-state expense. Rather,
just as each appellants oil-producing revenue as part of a unitary
business is not confined to a single State, so too the costs of produc-
ing this revenue are unitary in nature. "'77
The problem with the Court's answer is that it assumes, as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law, that all expenses of a unitary busi-
(2) The tax was fairly apportioned because it created little risk of multiple taxation. As I have ex-
plained elsewhere, see Hellerstein, note 70 supra, at 185, this is essentially a non sequitur.
While it is true that the fair apportionment requirement is designed to prevent multiple taxa-
tion, it does not follow that any tax that does not create the risk of multiple taxation is fairly
apportioned. Wholly apart from its role in preventing multiple taxation, the fair apportion-
ment criterion serves to limit the territorial reach of state tax power by requiring that the state's
tax base correspond to the taxpayer's in-state presence. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri
State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 323-35 (1968). There may be cases in which a state's tax
creates no risk of multiple taxation but nevertheless involve unquestioned extraterritorial taxa-
tion (e.g., if a state sought to tax the unapportioned income of all corporations doing business in
the state, but granted a credit for other states' taxes). In such cases, it is important that we not
lose sight of the fact that there is more to the fair apportionment criterion than avoiding the risk
of multiple taxation. The Court's opinion is unhelpful in that respect.
(3) The tax createdsome risk of multiple taxation, but provision of a tax credit eliminated thepossibility
of actual multiple taxation. As suggested in (2) above and as I have argued elsewhere, see Hellers-
tein, note 70supra, at 182-88, the provision of a tax credit does not make an unapportioned tax
"fairly apportioned," even though it may deal with the multiple taxation issue. The Court's
opinion may lead some readers to the opposite conclusion.
(4) True apportionment of the tax base, in the sense of division of the tax base on a mileage or other
geographic basis, was administratively and technologically impossible in light of the complexity of contem-
porary telecommunications networks. As noted above, see text accompanying notes 65-67 supra,
this conclusion is essentially untrue in light of the possibility of dividing the tax base on a fifty-
fifty split between the state of the calls' origin and destination. Moreover, it may encourage
states to adopt crude approaches to apportionment of technologically complex industries (e.g.,
financial services) when in fact more precise ways of measuring in-state presence are feasible.
See, e.g., the Multistate Tax Commission's Proposed Regulations for Apportioning the Income
of the Financial Services Industry, 1989 Multistate Tax Comn'n Rev. 17 (March 1989).
75The facts of Amerada Hess are set out at text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
76See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
77109 S. Ct. at 1622.
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ness bear the same relationship to that business as does the income
from the business. By hypothesis, then, such expenses are deemed to
constitute an inextricable component of the unitary business that
cannot be separately identified on a geographic basis. 78 But this as-
sumption is unwarranted. It may well be that unitary income, as the
Court effectively defined it in the very first case challenging the con-
stitutionality of formulary apportionment, is generated by a "series
of transactions" beginning with "manufacture" or production in one
state and "ending with sale in other states" so that 79
[t]he Legislature, in attempting to put upon this business its fair
share of the burden, of taxation was faced with the impossibility
of allocating specifically the profits earned by the processes con-
ducted within its borders.
It does not follow, however, that all the expenses of producing that
income are equally difficult to identify on a geographic basis. To be
sure, many expenses, such as the costs of centralized services or in-
terest payments on company-wide debt, would generally be as diffi-
cult to segregate on a geographic basis as the income these expenses
helped to generate. Other expenses, however, such as local real estate
taxes, clearly can be so segregated.
The mere fact that some expenses can be identified on a geo-
graphic basis does not mean that a denial of a deduction for those
expenses raises concerns about unfair apportionment. For example,
if a state denied a deduction for local real estate taxes no matter where
incurred, the increase in the apportionable tax base, and hence in
taxable income, would not implicate the fair apportionment crite-
rion. There is nothing in the disallowance of such a deduction that
would systematically distort the relationship between the income ap-
portioned to the state and the activities carried on there.
When, on the other hand, an expense can be identified on a geo-
graphic basis and that expense is associated exclusively with out-of-
state activity, the denial of a deduction for the expense from unitary
income does raise serious concerns about unfair apportionment. The
inexorable effect of denying the expense deduction is to increase the
portion of unitary income attributable to out-of-state activity. When
the income is apportioned to the deduction-denying state, the result
is the inclusion of a disproportionate component of out-of-state
78See note 47 supra.
79Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920).
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values in the tax base and the taxation of income that is necessarily
greater than can fairly be attributed to in-state business activities.
If, then, the windfall profit tax constitutes an exclusively out-of-
state expense, a persuasive case can be made that New Jersey's denial
of a windfall profit tax deduction violated the fair apportionment cri-
terion. The Court never reached this question because of its view
that "[flor fair apportionment purposes, the relevant question is
whether the windfall profit tax is a cost of a unitary business, rather
than what the attributes of that cost may be."' 80 Nevertheless, the
taxpayers had the better of the argument over the question whether
the windfall profit tax is in fact is a site-specific cost that is incurred
exclusively outside of New Jersey. It is imposed on a specific
activity-the removal of taxable crude oil-that occurs at a geo-
graphically identifiable location, and it has many of the earmarks of a
severance tax, which the Court itself has characterized as site-
specific. 8 '
Does this mean that the Court erred in failing to strike down New
Jersey's tax as unfairly apportioned? Not necessarily. First, even if
the Court had recognized the flaws in New Jersey's taxing scheme, it
might still have concluded (as it did in Amerada Hess) that the tax-
payers failed to carry the burden of proving unfair apportionment by
demonstrating "that there is no rational relationship between the in-
come attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enter-
prise."82Second, the Court may have declined to adopt a rule
condemning the disallowance of out-of-state expense deductions for
sound institutional reasons. Adoption of such a rule would have re-
quired courts to determine whether a whole array of routine tax de-
ductions pass constitutional muster (such as deductions for depletion
or for intangible drilling costs). Moreover, unless the Court had lim-
ited its holding to cases involving exclusively out-of-state expenses,
courts would have been saddled with the task of determining the
level of disallowed in-state expense deductions that would insulate
the disallowance of an out-of-state expense deduction from constitu-
tional attack. The mere prospect of overseeing the development of
such a body of case law may have dissuaded the Court from authoriz-
ing an inquiry into these questions.
BOAmerada Hy, 109 S.Ct. at 1622 n.7.
8
'See text at note 52 supra.
82Amerada Her, 109 S.Ct. at 1622 (quoting Container, 463 U.S. at 180).
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C. DISCRIMINATION
The rule forbidding state taxes that discriminate against interstate
commerce has been a central tenet of the Court's Commerce Clause
doctrine ever since the Court invoked the Clause more than a century
ago as the basis for invalidating a state tax.8 3 Although the concept of
discrimination is not self-defining and the Court has never precisely
delineated the scope of the prohibition against discriminatory taxes,
the essential meaning of discrimination as a criterion for adjudicating
the constitutionality of state taxes affecting interstate commerce
emerges unmistakably from the Court's numerous decisions ad-
dressing the issue: a tax that by its terms or operation imposes greater
burdens on out-of-state goods, activities, or enterprises than on com-
peting in-state goods, activities, or enterprises will be struck down as
discriminatory under the Commerce Clause.
In Goldberg, the taxpayers claimed that Illinois' 5 percent tax on the
gross receipts from interstate telecommunications discriminated
against interstate commerce, despite the existence of an identical 5
percent tax on intrastate telecommunications, because interstate
calls bore a relatively heavier tax burden than intrastate calls. The
argument can best be understood by illustration, which Justice Ste-
vens provided in his concurring opinion:8 4
A call originating in and terminating in Illinois that costs $10 is
taxed at full value at 5%. A second call, originating in Illinois but
terminating in Indiana, costs the same $10 and is taxed at the
same full value at the same 5% rate. But while Illinois may prop-
erly tax the entire $10 of the first call, it (technically) may tax
only that portion of the second call over which it has jurisdiction,
namely, the intrastate portion of the call (say, for example, $5).
By imposing an identical 500 tax on the two calls, Illinois has im-
posed a disproportionate burden on the interstate call.
The Court's reasoning dismissing the taxpayers' argument was un-
persuasive. The Court first noted that the Illinois tax was distin-
guishable from Pennsylvania's flat trucking taxes it had recently
invalidated because the levies bore more heavily on interstate trucks
than intrastate trucks.85 The former traveled fewer miles on state
highways than the latter and, as a consequence, interstate trucks
were subjected to a higher per-mile charge than the intrastate trucks
8 3See Weton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
84109 S.Ct. at 593 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
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for exercising the same privilege. The point of distinction the Court
perceived between the Pennsylvania and Illinois taxes was that Penn-
sylvania's taxes burdened out-of-state truckers, who would have dif-
ficulty effecting legislative change, whereas Illinois' tax burdened
local consumers, who presumably had access to the political pro-
cess.8 6 "It is not the purpose of the Commerce Clause," the Court
declared, "to protect state residents from their own state taxes."'87
Surely the Court cannot have meant what it said. If Illinois had
imposed a tax on state residents' purchases of out-of-state but not in-
state goods, the tax would have been struck down in short order. A
more blatant discrimination against interstate commerce in violation
of the "free trade" principles underlying the Commerce Clause is dif-
ficult to imagine. It is a cardinal purpose of the Commerce Clause to
protect state residents from their own state taxes when those taxes
discriminate against interstate Commerce. Justice Stevens recog-
nized this point in his concurring opinion.88 One would hope that
upon further reflection, the Court will repudiate its careless remark.
The Court's second ground for dismissing the taxpayers' discrimi-
nation claim was that, in contrast to the measurable indicia of local
presence reflected by the trucks' mileage on state highways which
provided the Court with a basis for finding that the Pennsylvania
highway taxes bore more heavily on out-of-state than local trucks,
"the exact path of thousands of electronic signals can neither be
traced nor recorded." 89 It "therefore" followed that the tax did not
discriminate against interstate commerce. 90 Despite the Court's pro-
fessed inability to identify the amount of discrimination, if any, that
resulted from the Illinois levy, one suspects that there is in fact some
discrimination if one analyzes the issue in terms of the example set
forth above. 91 Moreover, the Court has declared that "we need not
know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it unconstitu-
tionally discriminates. 92
The more compelling response to the discrimination claim was
that the taxpayers' argument proceeded on a false premise, namely,





9 1See text at note 84 supra.
9 2Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981).
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that the discrimination issue should be analyzed solely in terms of
calls that Illinois actually seeks to tax because they are charged to an
Illinois service address. If one instead analyzes the issue in terms of
the entire universe of calls originating and terminating in Illinois,
only about one-half of which Illinois seeks to tax, the discrimination
claim evaporates. 93 Justice Stevens, referring to the example set
forth above, 94 put it this way:9 5
Although Illinois taxes the entirety of every call charged to an
Illinois number, it does not tax any part of the calls that are re-
ceived at an Illinois number but charged elsewhere. Thus, al-
though Illinois taxes the entire Illinois-Indiana $10 call, it taxes
no part of the reciprocal Indiana-Illinois $10 call. At the 5% rate,
Illinois receives 500 from the two calls combined, precisely the
amount it receives from one $10 purely intrastate call. By taxing
half the relevant universe of interstate calls at full value, Illinois
achieves the same economic result as taxing all of those calls at
half value would achieve. As a result, interstate phone calls are
taxed at a lower effective rate than intrastate calls, and accord-
ingly bear a proportional tax burden.
In Amerada Hess, the taxpayers' constitutional attack on New
Jersey's denial of a windfall profit tax deduction was easily cast in the
form of an argument that the tax discriminated against interstate
commerce. The alleged effect of the statutory scheme was to single
out for special tax burdens a form of business activity that is con-
ducted only in other jurisdictions. The levy therefore imposed a dis-
criminatorily higher effective tax burden on out-of-state than on
local business. 96
Thus framed, however, the taxpayers' argument suffered from a
lack of evidence that New Jersey had intentionally or explicitly sin-
gled out the windfall profit tax for invidious treatment. Indeed, the
statute, which denied a deduction for "[t]axes paid or accrued to the
United States on or measured by profits or income," 9 7was drafted
long before the windfall profit tax was enacted in 1980. Moreover, it
was applied to deny a deduction for federal income taxes. Hence it
93The fair apportionment claim collapsed in a similar fashion when it was viewed in the con-
text of the entire universe of interstate telephone calls originating and terminating in Illinois.
See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
94See text at note 84 supra.
95109 S.Ct. at 593 (Stevens, J., concurring).
96 See Brief for Appellants 41-49, Amerada Hess, 109 S.Ct. 1617.
97N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:1OA-4(k) (West 1986).
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could not be argued that the statute by its terms or by design discrim-
inated against interstate commerce.
It is well settled, of course, that the Commerce Clause proscribes
taxes that, though nondiscriminatory on their face, nevertheless dis-
criminate against interstate commerce by their practical operation.98
If denying the windfall profit tax deduction in practical effect dis-
allows the deduction of an out-of-state expense, and there is no com-
parable in-state expense whose deduction is disallowed, then it
would seem that a prima facie case of state tax discrimination has
been stated. The Court found, however, that no such claim had been
stated. Its determination rested largely on the basis of the question-
able conclusion that the windfall profit tax was comparable to the
federal income tax-or at least that it was not "irrational or arbi-
trary" for New Jersey so to consider the tax.99 If the windfall profit
tax is viewed as comparable to the federal income tax, it undermines
the contention that out-of-state expense and business activity has
been singled out for discriminatory treatment because the federal in-
come tax is not an exclusively out-of-state expense. Once the Court
rejected the taxpayers' premise that the New Jersey statute singled
out the windfall profit tax for a deduction denial, it could leave for
another day the question "whether a statute that did so would imper-
missibly discriminate against interstate commerce." 100
D. FAIR RELATION BETWEEN THE TAX AND THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY
THE STATE
The first three prongs of the Court's contemporary Commerce
Clause standard-substantial nexus, fair apportionment, and
nondiscrimination-were familiar concepts deeply embedded in the
Court's doctrine for years before Complete Auto Transit was handed
down in 1977. By contrast, the fourth prong-the requirement that
9
sSee, e.g., Nippertv. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416,431(1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell,
311 U.S. 454,456 (1940).
99Amerada Hess, 109 S.Ct. at 1623 n.9. The Court based its conclusion on the facts that the
windfall profit tax was intended to reach only the excess income derived from oil production as
a result of decontrol, that the "net income limitation" assured that the tax was imposed only on
receipts above cost, and that the Internal Revenue Service characterized the structure of the tax
as more akin to an income tax than to an excise tax. Ibid. Most other observers, however, in-
cluding the Solicitor General, are of the view that the windfall profit tax more closely resem-
bles an ordinary severance tax than the federal income tax. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae in support of Juris. Statement 24-27; Attermeier & Reveley, note 54 supra;
Robison, note 54supra.
10°Amerada Hess, 109 S.Ct. at 1624.
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a tax be "fairly related to the services provided by the State" 0 1-was
an uncertain, if not an unknown, quantity when the Court articu-
lated it along with the other three Commerce Clause criteria in Com-
plete Auto Transit. Read literally, the Court's language could have
been taken as contemplating a detailed factual investigation into the
specific benefits the state provided to the taxpayer to ascertain
whether the value of the benefits bore a reasonable relationship to the
amount of the tax imposed. With the exception of cases involving
state-imposed user charges,10 2 however, no such detailed factual in-
vestigation had ever been required by the Court in determining the
validity of a tax under the Commerce Clause. Moreover, language in
several of its opinions following on the heels of Complete Auto Transit
suggested that the "fairly related" standard would be satisfied so long
as the state provided the taxpayer with "the benefits of a trained work
force and the advantages of a civilized society." 103
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,104 which considered a
challenge to Montana's 30 percent coal severance tax, the Court lifted
the shroud of uncertainty that had obscured the meaning of the
"fairly related" test and made it clear that the test was not an invita-
tion to judicial review of taxes for excessiveness. The Court held that
the relevant inquiry under the "fairly related" test is whether the tax
is reasonably related to the extent of the taxpayers' contact with the
state, "since it is the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State
that may properly be made to bear a 'just share of state tax bur-
den.'" 10 5 Justice Blackmun, the author of Complete Auto Transit, vig-
orously dissented from the Court's view of the meaning of the "fairly
related" test, asserting that the Court had "emasculated" the fourth
prong and left it utterly without meaning. 106
Cases following Commonwealth Edison vindicate Justice Blackmun's
complaint. The "fairly related" test appears to have little indepen-
dent significance as a restraint on state tax power. Any tax held to
violate the "fairly related" test is likely to flunk some other portion of
'lOComplete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
"o"See, e.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S.
707 (1972).
1"3Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979); see also Depart-
mentof Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750-51 (1978).
1-4453 U.S. 609 (1981).
"051d. at 626 (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
1061d. at 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the Court's Commerce Clause standard as well. 107 And it is hard to
conceive of any tax that would satisfy the substantial nexus, fair ap-
portionment, and nondiscrimination criteria that would not also sat-
isfy the "fairly related" test. 108
Goldberg and Amerada Hess reinforce this conclusion. The Court
had little difficulty in concluding that both levies, which had already
passed the first three prongs of the Court's Commerce Clause test,
likewise passed the fourth. In Goldberg, the Court observed that "It]he
fourth prong of the Complete Auto test focuses on fhe wide range of
benefits provided to the taxpayer, not just the precise activity con-
nected to the interstate activity at issue." 109 Illinois telephone con-
sumers received numerous benefits from Illinois, including "police
and fire protection as well as the other general services provided by
the State."110 The Illinois telecommunications tax therefore sur-
vived constitutional scrutiny, if it can be called that, under the "fairly
related" test. The Court similarly concluded that New Jersey's cor-
porate income tax was "fairly related" to the services provided by the
state in light of the benefits provided by New Jersey "'which include
police and fire protection, the benefits of a trained work force and
"the advantages of a civilized society." ' 111
O7Thus in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266,291(1987), the
only case in which the Court has invoked the "fairly related" test in striking down a state tax,
the flat tax on trucks was also held to violate the Commerce Clause's nondiscrimination re-
quirement.
0 8None exists to my knowledge.
109109 S.Ct. at 592.
11O bid.
I'Amerada Hess, 109 S.Ct. at 1624 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Reve-
nue, 447 U.S. 209, 228 (1980) (quotingJapan Line, Ltd, 441 U.S. at 445)).
The only other case touching on the Commerce Clause during the Court's 1988 Term was
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989), where the Court held that
New Mexico could validly impose severance taxes on oil and gas extracted from Indian lands
by non-Indian lessees despite the fact that the Indian tribe imposed similar taxes on the same
oil and gas production. In so holding the Court rejected the argument that the tax imposed a
multiple burden on interstate commerce. It reasoned that until Congress provides otherwise,
both the tribe and the state had taxing jurisdiction over the taxpayer's oil and gas leases. Id. at
1714. It also rejected the claim that the state tax exceeded the benefits provided to the taxpayer,
observing that "there is no constitutional requirement that the benefits received from a taxing
authority by an ordinary commercial taxpayer-or by those living in the community where
the taxpayer is located-must equal the amount of its tax obligations." Ibid. Finally, the Court
held that a tribe should not be treated as a state under the Commerce Clause for purposes of
determining whether the state's tax must be fairly apportioned: "[T]he fact that States and
tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory makes it inappropriate to apply
Commerce Clause doctrine developed in the context of commerce 'among' States with mutu-
ally exclusive territorial jurisdiction to trade 'with' Indian tribes." Id. at 1716.
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II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Supreme Court has construed the Due Process Clause as
a limitation on the territorial reach of the states' taxing powers. "12
The Due Process Clause, like the Commerce Clause, has been con-
strued to require that the state have a minimum connection or nexus
with the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax, and that the
measure of the tax fairly reflect the taxpayer's activities in the state,
i.e. that it be fairly apportioned. On numerous occasions the Court
has recognized that the requirements of the Commerce and Due Pro-
cess Clauses in the nexus and apportionment contexts are substan-
tially the same. 11 3 In Amerada Hess, the Court reiterated that "the
Complete Auto test encompasses due process standards."' 14 Thus in
the only due process challenge to a state tax it considered during its
1988 Term, the Court declared that because New Jersey's income tax
"passes all four prongs of the Complete Auto test, we also conclude
that it does not violate due process.""I5
III. THE EQUAL PROTECrION CLAUSE
In light of the broad leeway the states enjoy under the Equal
Protection Clause in drawing lines for tax purposes "when no spe-
cific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled," ' 16 it
may come as somewhat of a surprise that the Court has invalidated a
number of state taxes on equal protection grounds in recent years. In
the space of single year, the Court relied on the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down a gross premiums tax discriminating against
out-of-state insurers, 117 a use tax credit limited to residents for sales
taxes paid to other states, 118 and a property tax exemption limited to
"
2The Court first invoked the Due Process Clause as a prohibition of extraterritorial taxa-
tion in Louisville &Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385, 398 (1903). See Central
Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607,620 (1962) (Black, J., concurring).
It3See, e.g., National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967)
(nexus); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949) (apportionment).
114109 S.Ct. at 1625.
"Isbid.
"
6Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973); see also Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983) ("[legislatures have especially broad latitude in
creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes").
117 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
"
8Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
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Vietnam veterans who were residents of the state prior to a certain
date. 119
Perhaps these decisions can be explained by the fact that they
raised serious concerns of interstate federalism and therefore fell
within the exception to the Court's generally relaxed oversight of
state tax classifications. To be sure, this explanation flies in the face
of the Court's position that the Equal Protection Clause should not.
be construed as an "instrument of federalism." 120 It also runs coun-
ter to the Court's declaration that discrimination against out-of-state
interests need only be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose
to survive equal protection scrutiny. 121 Yet, it is difficult to make
sense of these decisions except as heightened judicial scrutiny
masquerading as "rational basis" analysis. 122
The Court's most recent decision striking down a state taxing
scheme under the Equal Protection Clause, however, cannot be ex-
plained on these grounds. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commiysion' 23 involved neither suspect classifications nor fundamen-
tal rights, and no specific federal interest, apart from equal protec-
tion, was jeopardized. Allegheny concerned a challenge to gross
disparities in ad valorem property tax assessments resulting from the
practice of assessing property based on its recent sales price. Like
many taxing jurisdictions across the country, Webster County, West
Virginia, relied on sales prices of recently conveyed property in de-
termining its value for ad valorem tax purposes and did not systemat-
ically adjust the assessment of unsold comparable properties to
reflect current value. So long as property was unsold, it remained on
the tax rolls with the same assessment it bore in prior years, with
only minor and infrequent adjustments. As a consequence, recently
conveyed property was often assessed at a much higher percentage of
its fair market value than was comparable property that had not
recently been sold. Indeed, the record in Allegheny revealed that
the taxpayers' property-consisting of coal-bearing lands-was as-
119Hooper v. Bernallilo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
12oWestem & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 667 n.21
(1981).
"'Ibid.
1'See Cohen, Federalism in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company v. Ward, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
123109 S.Ct. 633 (1989).
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sessed at approximately eight to 35 times more than comparable
neighboring properties. 124
In a brief opinion, the Court sustained the taxpayers' claim that
the county's assessment practice violated the Equal Protection
Clause. While reiterating the well-entrenched principle that the
states have broad powers under the Clause to impose different types
of taxes upon different types of taxpayers and property, the Court
observed that the county assessor made no attempt to justify the dis-
parities in assessment on the ground that recently sold and unsold
property constituted two different classes of property that were to be
taxed differently according to deliberate state policy. Indeed, the op-
posite was true: West Virginia's constitution and implementing stat-
utes provided that all the property in question was to be taxed at a
uniform rate throughout the state according to its value. Given the
state's own professed adherence to a standard of uniformity and
equality of property assessments based on market value, the county
assessor's reliance on actual sales prices as the basis for achieving such
equality could not be justified as a state-sanctioned classification
scheme.
Nor could the practice be viewed as a mere "transitional delay in
adjustment of assessed value"125 or as one of those "occasional errors
or state law or mistakes in judgment" 126 that the Equal Protection
Clause would tolerate. In contrast to a program of generalized ad-
justments in property values designed to equalize the value of prop-
erties for short periods without the necessity of reappraising every
parcel every year, the assessor's occasional adjustments to the assess-
ment of unsold property were "too small to seasonably dissipate the
remaining disparity between these assessments and the assessments
based on a recent purchase price."' 127 Moreover, the assessor's prac-
tice that produced the disparate assessments was "intentional"' 28
and "systematic"'129 and therefore could not be dismissed as a per-
missible error in judgment.
From a doctrinal perspective, the Court's opinion in Allegheny is
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valuation by state officials of other taxable property in the same class
contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value
of his property." 130 In light of the Court's determination that the dis-
criminatory assessments resulted from "intentional systematic un-
dervaluation" by the county assessor and that the property in
question was considered by West Virginia to fall within a single
class, it followed as a matter of course that the taxpayers had been
denied equal protection. 131
From a practical perspective, however, the Court's holding has
considerable significance. There are hundreds of taxing jurisdictions
throughout the nation with "methods" of achieving equality among
different parcels that are essentially indistinguishable from that of
Webster County, West Virginia. Assessments from such jurisdic-
tions would appear to be vulnerable to equal protection challenge, at
least if disparities of the magnitude that were proven in Allegheny can
be demonstrated elsewhere.1 32
The Court's decision in Allegheny also raises serious questions
about the constitutionality of California's Proposition 13.133 Proposi-
tion 13 amended the state constitution to limit property taxes to 1
percent of 1975-76 valuations and to prohibit annual increases in
valuations of more than 2 percent, unless the property is sold. The
Court was well aware of the potential implications of its decision for
California's taxing system, and observed in a footnote: 134
We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster
County assessment method would stand on a different footing if
it were the law of a State, generally applied, instead of the aberra-
13oSunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1918). See also Sioux City
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,445-46 (1923); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of
Revision of Tax Assessments, 284 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1931); Hillsborough v. Town of Cromwell,
326 U.S. 620 (1946).
13 
'The Court also held, in line with established precedent, see cases cited in note 130 supra,
that the taxpayers could not be relegated to the remedy of seeking to have the assessments of the
undervalued property raised, as the West Virginia Supreme Court had suggested. In re 1975
Tax Assessments against Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560, 565 (W. Va. 1987). Rather they
were entitled under the Equal Protection Clause to have their assessments reduced to the level
at which comparable properties were assessed.
1"2See, e.g., Township of West Milford v. Van Decker, 235 N.J. Super. 1, 561 A.2d 607
(1989) (increased asessment of property based on sales price violates federal and state constitu-
tions); Krugman v. Village of Atlantic Beach, 121 A.D.2d 175, 533 N.Y.S.2d 495 (2d Dep't
1988) (assessor's practice of selective reassessment of only those properties in the taxing district
that were sold during the prior year contravenes statutory and constitutional mandates).
"'Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, §2.
134109 S.Ct. at 638 n.4.
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tional enforcement policy it appears to be. The State of Califor-
nia has adopted a similar policy.., popularly known as
"Proposition 13.".. . The system is grounded on the belief that
taxes should based on the original cost of property and should not
tax unrealized paper gains in the value of property.
The Court appears to be suggesting that Webster County's dis-
crimination against recently purchased property may be distinguish-
able from California's because the former reflected the "aberrational"
actions of a single assessor, contrary to the policy of West Virginia to
tax all property equally, whereas the latter reflects the considered
policy of a state. But one has to ask which way that distinction cuts.
Is the Equal Protection Clause less offended by discrimination that
reflects deliberate state policy than by discrimination resulting from
the aberrational conduct of a single individual?
Although as an original proposition one might have thought not,
an affirmative answer to this question is deeply rooted in equal pro-
tection doctrine. The Equal Protection Clause, after all, only pro-
tects against unjustifiable discrimination. If "rational basis" is the
standard of justification, as it is in the context of tax classifications
that do not implicate federal concerns apart from equal protec-
tion, 135 then if the discrimination has a "rational basis," as it argua-
bly does in California, it will pass muster under the Equal Protection
Clause. 13 6
Assuming that California's ad valorem property tax system would
survive scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,' 3 7 it raises a se-
3
-
5 Because the practice of reassessing property based on recent sales will bear dispropor-
tionately on newcomers to the taxing jurisdiction, including those who have moved from other
states, one could argue that such a practice does in fact raise federalism concerns, thus trigger-
ing a higher standard of equal protection scrutiny. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Indeed, as suggested above, see text accompanying notes 116-22 supra, the Court has
been inclined to strike down taxing schemes that threaten federalism interests even under a
"rational basis" analysis. See cases cited in notes 117-19 supra; see also Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55 (1982).
136But see note 135 supra. Writing without the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in
Allegheny, the California Supreme Court dismissed a constitutional challenge to Proposition 13
on equal protection and other grounds. Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281 (1981). The
Court distinguished the principal cases underlying the Allegheny decision, see cases cited in
note 130 supra, on the ground that those cases "involved constitutional or statutory provisions
which mandated the taxation of property on a current value basis" and they "do not purport to
confine the states to a current value system under equal protection principles." 22 Cal. 3d at
235, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251, 583 P.2d at 1293. No review of this decision was sought in the
United States Supreme Court.
137A definitive resolution of this issue is possible in due course. See Northwest Financial,
Inc. v. San Diego County, Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Cty., No. 611092, filed April 12, 1989
(challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 13 in light of Allegheny).
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ries of additional questions bearing on the relationship between a
taxpayer's federal right to equal protection and the underlying state
classification scheme. If a state can classify property for ad valorem
tax purposes on the basis of sales price, then, as the Court has stated
in an analogous context, "the only question relevant for us is whether
the state has done so."138 The Court's conclusion in Allegheny, of
course, was based on its determination that the state had not done
so. 139 Does this mean, however, that if West Virginia tomorrow were
formally to adopt an ad valorem tax system based on recent sales
prices that the preexisting practice of the Webster County assessor
would satisfy equal protection strictures? Apparently so, assuming
the constitutionality of Proposition 13.
But why should the result be any different merely because the
classification in West Virginia was de facto rather than de jure? As
the Court declared in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 140 in dis-
missing an equal protection challenge by a railroad to the valuation of
its property which was overvalued by comparison to the valuation of
other property in Tennessee: 141
If the discrimination of which the Railway complains had been
formally written into the statutes of Tennessee, a challenge to its
constitutionality would be frivolous. If the state supreme court
had construed the requirement of uniformity in the Tennessee
Constitution so as to permit recognition of these diversities, no
appeal could successfully be made to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Here... all the organs of the state are conforming to a
practice, systematic, unbroken for more than forty years, and
now questioned for the first time. It would be a narrow concep-
tion of jurisprudence to confine the notion of "laws" to what is
found written on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss
which life has written upon it. Settled state practice cannot sup-
plant constitutional guarantees, but it can establish what is state
law.... And if the state supreme court chooses to cover up un-
der a formal veneer of uniformity the established system of dif-
ferentiation between two classes of property, an exposure of that
fiction is not enough to establish its unconstitutionality..., the
Equal Protection Clause is not a command of candor.
3 8
sNashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369(1940). The first clause of the
sentence quoted in the text reads "[slince, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, a state
can put railroad property into one pigeonhole and other property into another.. ." Ibid.
39 See text following note 124 supra.
1-310 U.S. 362 (1940).
4lId. at 369.
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The Court's answer would presumably be the one it gave in Alle-
gheny: "There is no suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Court
of West Virginia, or from any other authoritative source, that the
State may have adopted a different system in practice from that spec-
ified by statute. 14 2 But it is difficult to reconcile this view with the
West Virginia Supreme Court's declaration that "[t]he uniform use of
recent deed values as the basis for appraising property subject to ad
valorem taxation does not violate W. Va. Const., art X, § 1 ['taxation
shall be equal and uniform throughout the State']." 143 If the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court may "cover up under a formal veneer of uni-
formity the established system of differentiation between two classes
of property," 144 why may not the West Virginia Supreme Court do
so? Perhaps the evidence of the adoption of an implicit policy applied
evenhandedly to all similarly situated property in the state was not as
strong in West Virginia as it was in Tennessee. 145 In any event, the
Court's opinion in Allegheny leaves us with this perplexing question:
When does "intentional systematic undervaluation by state officials
of property in the same class," 146 which is nevertheless sanctioned
by the highest court of the state as satisfying that state's uniformity
and equality requirement, amount merely to a covering up "under a
formal veneer of uniformity the established system of differentiation
between two classes of property"? 147
There is one final variation on Allegheny's implications for the rela-
tionship between federal and state law that is worthy of considera-
tion, illustrated by a recent decision of the Nebraska Supreme
Court. 148 Most personal property in Nebraska is exempt from taxa-
tion. The personal property of railroads, pipelines, and other
centrally assessed utilities is taxable, however. After the railroads'
personal property had been held excludable from ad valorem taxa-
tion under a federal statute protecting railroads from discriminatory
taxation, 149 the pipelines, which are not protected by the statute,
142109 S.Ct. at 638.
1431n re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560, 564 (W. Va. 1987).
'-Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 310 U.S. at 369.
14'See Allegheny, 109 S.Ct. at 638-39.
'6Sunday Lake Iron, 247 U.S. at 352-53.
147Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 310 U.S. at 369.
'"Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 232 Neb. 806,
443 N.W.2d 249 (1989).
14949 U.S.C. §11503 (1982).
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claimed that they were entitled to the same treatment as the rail-
roads. Relying on both the state uniformity provision and the federal
Equal Protection Clause, the Nebraska court sustained the pipelines
claim.
The significant question raised by the Nebraska decision is
whether the lowering of assessed property values of some taxpayers
pursuant to federal law' 50 provides other taxpayers of the same class
with a right to the same treatment under the Equal Protection
Clause. Although a mechanical application of Allegheny could lead to
that conclusion, such a conclusion is unwarranted. In Allegheny and
its predecessors, 151 the states were under no federal obligation to
classify. The states' classification scheme, or lack thereof, therefore
governed the equal protection inquiry. So long as the states' classifi-
cation met the loose "rational basis" requirement, the only judicially
cognizable equal protection question was whether the state had in
fact accorded equal treatment to property it had placed in a particular
class.
In the Nebraska case, by contrast, federal law created a classifica-
tion scheme that is binding on the states. So long as this classification
scheme has a rational basis, as the federal legislation plainly does, no
substantial equal protection attack can be leveled against the classifi-
cation. And this is so regardless of how the states might originally
have classified the property at issue apart from their obligation to
conform to federal law. In short, it would misread Allegheny to con-
clude that the Equal Protection Clause requires that all property the
state places in a particular class must be treated alike when federal
law dictates that one subclass 152 of such property be assessed at a
lower rate than that prescribed by the state for the class in ques-
tion. 15 3
lSOThere are federal statutes providing motor carriers and air carriers with similar protection
to that afforded railroads against discriminatory property taxation. 49 U.S.C. § 11503a (1982);
49 U.S.C. App. §1513(d) (1982).
I'See note 130supra.
IS2As indicated above, the subclassification must be able to survive equal protection scru-
tiny.
's
3See State v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 471 So. 2d 408 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984), writ. quashed,
Ex Parte Colonial Pipeline Co., 471 So. 2d 413 (Ala. 1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 936
(1985) and Federal Express Corp. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, 717 S.W.2d 873
(Tenn. 1986) both of which reached conclusions contrary to the Nebraska Supreme Court on
this issue.
The only other equal protection issue addressed by the Court during its 1988 Term was
raised by Amerada Hess. The Court summarily dismissed the claim, noting that "there is no
discriminatory classification" underlying NewJersey's denial of the windfall profit tax deduc-
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IV. INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
From the very beginning of our constitutional history, it has
been clear that the states may not impose taxes discriminating
against the federal government. Indeed, the seminal case articulating
the doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation, McCullocb v.
Maryland,15 4 involved a tax that discriminated against the federal
government, and the decision could have been read as suggesting that
the immunity the federal government enjoyed from state taxation ap-
plied only to taxes that discriminated against the federal govern-
ment. 1 55 In any event, despite the Court's narrowing of the federal
government's immunity in cases involving nondiscriminatory
taxes, 156 the Court has steadfastly adhered to the fundamental prin-
ciple that the Supremacy Clause bars taxes discriminating against
the federal government. '5 7
The Court revisited the question of the federal government's im-
munity from discriminatory taxation during its 1988 Term in Davis v.
Michigan Department of Treasury. 158 Like many other states, Michigan
exempted from personal income taxation all retirement benefits paid
by the state or its political subdivisions while taxing retirement bene-
fits paid by all other employers, including the federal government.
Paul Davis, a former federal employee who argued the case on his
own behalf in the Supreme Court, contended that Michigan's ex-
emption for state but not federal employees was barred by federal
law. Although the technical question before the Court was whether
the state's disparate treatment of state and federal employees violated
a federal statute preserving federal employees' immunity from dis-
criminatory taxation,1 5 9 the Court concluded that the immunity
tion and that "there is unquestionably a rational basis" for such denial. Amerada Hess, 109 S.Ct.
at 1625.
1544 Wheat. 316 (1819).
Mld. at 436; First Agricultural National Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 392 U.S. 229, 350 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15 6See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536 (1983); United States v. New Mex-
ico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). Broadly speaking, modem case law has narrowed the federal govern-
ment's immunity from nondiscriminatory taxes to levies whose legal incidence falls on the
federal government.
'"7See, e.g., Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983); Phillips Chemical
Co. v. Dumas Independent School District, 361 U.S. 376 (1960).
158109 S.Ct. 1500 (1989).
159The statute at issue, 4 U.S.C. §111 (1988), provides in pertinent part: "The United States
consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee of
[1989
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guaranteed by the statute was "coextensive with the prohibition
against discriminatory taxes embodied in the modem constitutional
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.' 60
Michigan's taxing scheme indisputably discriminated in favor of
state retirees and against federal retirees. The state argued, however,
that the individual federal retiree was not entitled to claim the pro-
tection of the immunity doctrine and, in any event, that the state's
differential treatment of state and federal retirees was justified
by meaningful distinctions between the two classes of taxpayers.
In striking down the levy, the Court rejected both of these argu-
ments.
The state's first contention-that the federal immunity doctrine
did not protect the federal retiree-was premised on the notion that
the immunity doctrine was designed to protect the federal govern-
ment, not private entities or individuals. So long as the challenged
tax did not interfere with the federal government's ability to perform
its governmental functions, the argument continued, there has been
no violation of the immunity doctrine. While agreeing with the
state's characterization of the overall purpose of the immunity doc-
trine, the Court disagreed with the inference the state drew from it.
In the Court's eyes, it simply "does not follow that private entities or
individuals who are subjected to discriminatory taxation on account
of their dealings with a sovereign cannot themselves receive the pro-
tection of the constitutional doctrine."' 61lndeed, the Court observed
that all precedent was to the contrary,' 62 and the Court saw no reason
to depart from that precedent.
The state's second defense of the less favorable treatment of federal
as compared to state retirees was based on the ground that there were
significant differences between the two classes of taxpayers. The
state argued that its interest in hiring and retaining qualified civil ser-
vants through the inducement of exempting retirement benefits jus-
tified the preferential treatment of its retired employees. But the
Court found this argument beside the point because it merely
showed that the state had a rational basis for discriminating between
the United States ... by a duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation
does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or com-
pensation."
16009 S.Ct. at 1506.
16Ibid.
162See, e.g., cases cited in note 157 supra.
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two groups of retirees, not that there were significant differences be-
tween the classes. 163
The state found further significant differences between state and
federal retirees warranting exemption for the former but not the lat-
ter in the fact that state retirees generally received less generous re-
tirement benefits than their federal counterparts. The Court again
was unpersuaded. Even assuming the state was correct in its evalua-
tion of the relative value of state and federal retirement benefits, the
discrimination the state practiced did not serve its ostensible purpose:
"A tax exemption truly intended to account for differences in retire-
ment benefits would not discriminate on the basis of the source of
those benefits, as Michigan's does; rather it would discriminate on the
basis of the amount of benefits received by individual retirees." 164
Justice Stevens filed a lone dissent from the Court's opinion in
Davis. He recognized that there was "discrimination" against federal
in favor of state retirees, but he did not regard such discrimination as
unconstitutional. "The fact that a State may elect to grant a prefer-
ence, or an exemption, to a small percentage of its residents does not
make the tax discriminatory in any sense that is relevant to the doc-
trine of intergovernmental immunity." 165 Injustice Stevens' view, so
long as the tax imposed on federal retirees was imposed on the vast
majority of voters in the state, as Michigan's tax was, there is a suffi-
cient "political check" against excessive taxation to obviate the con-
cerns that underlie the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. 166
As Davis suggests, the critical issue in cases involving allegations of
state tax discrimination against the federal government often boils
down to the delineation of the appropriate universe of taxpayers with
whom the federal taxpayers are to be compared. In Davis and other
cases 167 in which those who dealt with the federal government were
treated like the vast majority of other taxpayers in the state, but less
favorably than a small group of taxpayers who dealt with the state,
163109 S.Ct. at 1508. The Court reiterated the point it had made in response to a similar
argument in Phillips Chemical, 361 U.S. 376, that the criteria for adjudicating alleged discrimi-
nation against the federal government are not the loose standards associated with equal protec-




16 7SeePhillips, 361 U.S. 376 (1960); Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744
(1961); Memphis Bank, 459 U.S. 392 (1983); United States v. City of Manassas, 108 S. Ct.
1568 (1988) aff'g without opinion 830 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1987).
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the question whether there is unconstitutional discrimination de-
pends entirely on whether one limits the comparison to those who
deal with the federal and state governments or whether one takes ac-
count of the vast majority of other taxpayers who are treated like
those who deal with the federal government. DespiteJustice Stevens'
plea that the relevant question is whether the vast majority of tax-
payers in the state are treated like those who deal with the federal
government, thereby providing a "political check" against abuse of
the power to tax, 168 the Court's precedents show its strong inclina-
tion to strike down taxes that favor those who deal with the state over
those who deal with the federal government. 169 However attractive
Justice Stevens' position may be in theory, the Court apparently feels
more comfortable with the simpler notion that "it does not seem too
much to require that the State treat those who deal with the Govern-
ment as well as it treats those with whom it deals itself."' 170
The Court has not clearly indicated, on the other hand, whether a
statute that treats those who deal with public or exempt entities (in-
cluding the federal government) differently from those who deal
with the private sector constitutes unconstitutional discrimination
against the federal government. For example, would a statute im-
posing a gross receipts tax on public contractors be constitutional? In
most cases, the issue does not arise because those who deal with the
federal government are treated like all other taxpayers in the state, or
like all other taxpayers except a favored class of taxpayers who deal
with the state. In light of Davis and other cases condemning taxes that
treat those who deal with the federal government differently from
those who deal with the state, one suspects that the Court would in-
validate a tax treating those who deal with the federal government
differently from taxpayers in the private sector except those who deal
with public entities or other exempt property owners. 171
Whatever the doctrinal significance of Davis, its fiscal implications
M6 sDavis, 109 S.Ct. at 1513, 1514; cf. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452,458
(1977).
169See note 167 supra.
170Pbillips, 361 U.S. at 385.
171See United States v. Montana, 437 F. Supp. 354(D. Mont. 1977), rev'd on othergrounds,
440 U.S. 147 (1979) (invalidating gross receipts tax limited to public contractors); Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 167-72 (White, J., dissenting); County ofFresno, 429 U.S. at471-
72 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (tax limited to lessees of publicly owned property unconstitutional);
but see Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 505 P.2d 102
(1973).
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for the states are truly staggering. Nearly half the states accorded dis-
parate treatment to state and federal retirees prior to Davis. 172 Re-
fund exposure has been estimated at $140-192 million for Arizona,
$30-40 million for Iowa, $160 million for Missouri, $66 million for
Oklahoma, $142 million for Oregon, $150 million for South
Carolina, $370 million for Virginia, and $130 million for Wisconsin,
to name just a few of these states. 173 State legislatures across the
country have been scrambling to deal with the problem created by
Davis, either by exempting federal employees, taxing state employ-
ees, or some combination of both. 174 And these legislative solutions
are certain to spawn additional litigation. As Georgia's state budget
director put it on the eve of a legislative session that nobody wanted
which was called to adopt a pension plan that nobody likes: "I think
we'll probably be sued by the state employees..., we'll be sued by
the federal employees, and we'll be sued by the general public."'' 7 5
V. CONCLUSION
During its 1988 Term, the Court harvested another bumper
crop of state tax cases. The Court addressed issues ranging across the
entire constitutional spectrum, 76 and it rendered decisions of con-
siderable practical significance. One might have thought that the
flow of state tax litigation to the Supreme Court would have been the
first casualty of the elimination of the Court's mandatory appellate
172BNA, Daily Tax Report G-1 (August 11, 1989); c. Davis, 109 S.Ct. at 1511 n.3 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
173BNA, Daily Tax Report, note 172 supra, at G-2-G-3.
'741bid.
'"5"Special legislative session called to patch state's pension law," Athens Daily News, p. 1,
col. 2, Sept. 10, 1989.
The Court decided two other cases during its 1988 Term involving Supremacy Clause and
intergovernmental immunity issues. Both were narrow in scope and of relatively modest im-
port. In Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Department of Revenue, 109 S. Ct. 582 (1989), the Court held
that the provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act that "State taxation laws shall not
apply to the outer Continental Shelf," 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1982), did not prohibit Iowa from
including in Shell's apportionable tax base income that it derived from a unitary business con-
ducted in part in the Outer Continental Shelf. In California State Board of Equalization v.
Sierra Summit, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2228 (1989), the Court held that California was neither pre-
empted by federal law nor barred by the intergovernmental immunity doctrine from imposing
a sales or use tax on bankruptcy liquidation sales.
'76The 1988 Term cases considered in this article raised issues that are central to the Court's
constitutional doctrine limiting state taxes. I leave it to others to untangle Court's state tax cases
involving First Amendment and Indian immunity issues. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
109 S. Ct. 890 (1989); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).
[1989
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jurisdiction. 177 The Court's grant of plenary consideration to state
tax cases shows no sign of abating, however. 178 For those who labor
in the state tax field, there remain many rows to plow.
17728 U.S.C.A. § 1257 (Supp. 1989).
17SAt this writing, the Court has five state tax cases on its 1989 Term docket. In addition to
the two 1988 Term cases set for reargument, see note 6 supra, the Court has agreed to review
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 204 Cal. App. 3d 151, 250 Cal. Rptr. 891
(1988), prob. juris. noted, 109 S.Ct. 1741 (1989); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminium, 860
F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. granted, 109 S.Ct. 1741 (1989); Missouri v. Jenkins,
855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. granted, 109 S.Ct. 1930 (1989).
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